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DOI: Application Problems Of Commercial Speech Doctrine In CIS Countries: On The Example Of Russia And Uzbekistan
Khodjaev Bakhshillo Kamolovich , Dean Of The Private Law Faculty At The Tashkent State University Of Law, Doctor Of Laws (LL.D.) From Nagoya University, UzbekistanAbstract
This article analyzes the application of the Commercial Speech Doctrine in CIS countries such as
Russian and Uzbekistan. The article shows that the commercial speech doctrine was implemented as
a constitutional principle of information freedom; however Federal Advertising law of Russia gives
priority to the public health rather than commercial speech protection. The article concludes that, in
CIS countries, especially in Uzbekistan and Russia, the government interest to control commercial
information flow has become superior to that of competitor and consumer interests. The presence of
strict legal standards in those countries causes unreasonable government interference in free
commercial speech of advertisers and restricts the flow of commercial information. Therefore, they
are unnecessary and excessive to proper regulation of misleading advertising. Hence, the main
principle of the commercial speech doctrine on the limitation of government intervention does not
work in practice.
Keywords
Commercial speech, , First Amendment
References
R. H. Coase, “Advertising and Free
Speech,” The Journal of Legal
Studies 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1977): 1–34.
“The 1st Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution,” National Constitution
Center – The 1st Amendment of the
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Susan Edlavitch, “The Fairness
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Product Commercials,” Indiana Law
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Cohen, “Advertising & the First
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Thomas Merrill, “First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising:
The New Constitutional Doctrine,”
University of Chicago Law Review 44,
no. 1 (September 1, 1976): 242.
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See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(Supreme Court 1975).
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
(Supreme Court 1942).; Bigelow, 421
U.S. 809.; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
U.S. 350 (Supreme Court 1977).
Cohen, “Advertising & the First
Amendment:” 61.
Advertising which requires additional
information, disclaimers or warnings
also to be considered as unprotected
commercial speech. See Va. Pharmacy
Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
(Supreme Court 1976).
The truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech is usually evaluated
on basis of "listener is self-determining
agent", because true information is
necessary in listener`s decision making
capability. See Sullivan, “Cheap Spirits,
Cigarettes, and Free Speech:” 156.
Some judges of the US Supreme court
suggested that an advertising, which
has tendency to deceive is evaluated to
be "less protected".
Merrill, “First Amendment Protection
for Commercial Advertising:” 213.
Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner,
“Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?”
Virginia Law Review 76, no. 4 (1990):
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