Articles
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DOI: ANALYZING COLLUSION BEHAVIOR UNDER VARIOUS PRICING SCHEMES
Florian Rasch , Leibniz Centre For European Economicresearch (Zew), Mannheim, GermanyAbstract
Collusion among firms is a significant concern in various industries as it can lead to anticompetitive behavior and harm consumer welfare. This study aims to analyze collusion behavior under different pricing schemes employed by firms. By examining the impact of pricing strategies on collusion, we seek to gain insights into the effectiveness of different pricing mechanisms in deterring or facilitating collusive practices.
Through a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation, we evaluate the behavior of firms operating in different industries and markets. We consider pricing schemes such as uniform pricing, price discrimination, and dynamic pricing, among others. The study explores how these pricing strategies affect the likelihood and stability of collusion among firms.
Keywords
Collusion, pricing schemes, anticompetitive behavior
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