BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN ANGLO-SAXON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Malikabonu ABDULLAEVA , PhD, Law Enforcement Academy of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, UzbekistanAbstract
This paper provides a comprehensive review of two fundamental principles in Anglo-Saxon criminal justice systems: the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. These principles form the bedrock of fair trial rights and are crucial to ensuring justice in criminal proceedings. Through an extensive analysis of legal scholarship, case law, and comparative studies, this research examines the historical development, theoretical underpinnings, and practical applications of these principles in various Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The paper also explores contemporary challenges to these principles, such as terrorism legislation and the rise of administrative penalties, and offers recommendations for preserving their integrity in modern criminal justice systems.
Keywords
Burden of proof, presumption of innocence, criminal justice
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