



Amir Temur's Geopolitical Practice In The Eurasian Region And Its Modern Interpretations

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes Amir Temur's geopolitical practice in the Eurasian region and its modern interpretations. Many historians today agree that Amir Temur's military wars in the Eurasian region were not accidental and that they were carried out on the basis of certain geopolitical necessities, and that his "aggressive" actions were distorted in violation of historical truth. Of course this is natural. There is a saying that the complex activities of a complex period, complex individuals, still hold many contradictions in its bosom. These contradictions reaffirm that interests are an unchanging reality over the centuries. On this issue, we also dared to submit our observations to the scientific community for discussion.

KEYWORDS

Amir Temur, "aggressive", Eurasian region, Sahibkiran

INTRODUCTION

Khorezm was the first step of Sahibkiran on the way to these great goals, without which it was impossible to defend Dashti Kipchak. It seeks to address these issues through a partnership

agreement in the first place. However, if Amir Temur cares about the unity of the country, people like Hussein Sufi (who was also a member of the Chigatay elite) will not be able to get out of the whirlpool of narrow

interests. However, Khorezm was divided into northern and southern regions by the Joji and Chigatay nations during this period. So far, the southern part was independent, but did not have a protective cover that could repel a threat from the north.

THE MAIN RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Such a neighboring territory was subjugated in 1373-1374 due to the greater risk of joining the Joji Nation (which has been confirmed in practice many times). The military support of the ceasefire by Sahibkiran was in fact aimed at weakening the White Horde ruler Urushan while strengthening the northern borders. However, when Noshud Tokhtamish, who ascended the throne of the Golden Horde (Oltin Orda), came to power (1380), he severed ties with Amir Temur. Thus, a more dangerous area for Turan is formed on the northern borders. These actions of the White Horde ruler Urushan and the ruler of Mongolia Amir Qamariddin required Amir Temur to be vigilant. As a result of the measures taken in this direction, the fifth march to Khorezm was decided in 1388.

Before the decisive battle with Sahibkiran Tokhtamish, he made two expeditions to Mongolia between 1389-1390 in order to secure his state from Mongolia and East Turkestan (Kashgar). The Mongol fled to Khizrkhoja, asked for Qamariddin's daughter, established kinship with her, and became a benevolent and partner state to her. Ibn Arabshah said: "First he flirted with the Mongols, kissed them on the nose and mouth, made a peace treaty, gave them presents and received a gift, and they married the daughter of their king, Qamariddin. Thus Timur became confident (free) from their persecution and oppression. The Mongols were its neighbors

from the east, and there was no difference between them and Timur. This is because of the gender, divisiveness and neighborliness that happened on both sides. Their religion was the Genghis Khan Torah, which was valid in both countries. That is why Timur was safe from the evils of the Mongols and was sure of their devious and cruel ways. " explains. Therefore, in 1376, taking advantage of the absence of Amir Temur in Samarkand, Qamariddin and Anko Tora attacked Fergana, Sayram and Turkestan and looted the civilian population. It turned out that the clash with the early Mongols also showed that it was not a coincidence or an invasion, as opponents say. In addition, in terms of regional policy, there is the Golden Horde (Blue and White Hordes), which is geographically divided around Turan, which has never and never had the opportunity to develop a state centered on them. Preserving the independence of the new state required non-standard approaches in the field of foreign policy. We know that the instability in the Khorezm region, the conquest of Tabriz by Tokhtamishkhan, and the abstract situation in Balkh and Khorasan were the main reasons for Amir Temur's concern. Although, at the time, there were proposals for a truce with them.

On the eve of the establishment of the Turan state, Amir Temur was considered to be the center of extremely complex and sharp political processes in the neighboring regions. In the Middle East, the Kurds (Herat), the Sarbadars (Sabzavar, Nishapur, Astrobod, Mashhad), the Muzaffarids (Persia, Kerman, Kurdistan), the Jalairis (Iraq, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Western Iran), the Caucasus fought each other. At that time, the political situation in Europe was also complicated and centralized states were emerging. In Italy,

France, and England, the struggle for centralized power intensified, and these states waged wars that drained each other. The war between England and France, which began in 1337 and continued unabated, lasted more than 100 years. Political disunity prevailed in Germany and Spain as well. Conflicts between Anglo-Spanish and Spanish-Portuguese had intensified. The Ottoman Empire used this skillfully.

This tumultuous political conflict in the Eurasian region naturally attracts an independent state formed by its own interests. Thus, the second phase of Amir Temur's activity (1386-1404) included three-year, five-year and seven-year military campaigns to the lands of the Golden Horde, Iran, Iraq, the Caucasus, Asia Minor, Egypt and India. These marches are undoubtedly carried on with uncompromising and terrifying violence. It should be noted that all the geopolitical processes that have taken place in Eurasia are aimed at moving to the center of the continent on the basis of historically formed strict laws. The geopolitical importance of Central Asia and its security meant that conflicts were inevitable because it was at the crossroads of different interests due to its location between the continent's largest powers of the time, including Mongolia, the Golden Horde, China, Turkey, and Iran.

As a skilful politician and a unique military strategist, Amir Temur first focused on ensuring the security of the Turan border areas by occupying countries in internal conflict in accordance with his idea. One such march was in the direction of Iran. Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi said, "At that time, in the province of Iran, there was a congregation in every country that ruled and ruled." According

to the data, in the second half of the 14th century, Iran was not a separate independent state, one side of which belonged to the Jalayir state (1336-1441), the other to Azerbaijan, and the other to the Sarbadars (1336-1381). The Shiraz sides looked at the Muzaffarid dynasty. Conflicts between dynasties were also sufficient. Only the people were oppressed. Therefore, they appealed to Amir Temur for help.

The invasion of Tabriz by Tokhtamishkhan and the destruction of the city naturally changed the plans of Sahibkiran. Squeezing the Turan was part of the geostrategic goals of the Stop. Therefore, Amir Temur decided to annex the dispersed Iran to Tokhtamish, which would be the basis for the complete conquest of Hulugu's property. Indeed, after the conquest of Iran, the main part of Hulugu's possessions, and its two capitals, Tabriz and Sultanate, it was impossible not to include its parts, Iraq, Syria, and Eastern Anatolia. Because the rulers of these lands took refuge in the enemies of Timur, and their lands became a base for provocation and attack on the Amir. Moreover, the fact that the states of the Caucasus were in alliance with the Mongol hordes not only posed a political threat, but also hindered their trade. Among them were the disagreements between Iran and Iraq, which were divided into small separate powers, which led to its disintegration. The lack of security in the Middle East increased the likelihood of invading gangs and threatened Turan from the south.

Another reason for Amir Temur's military campaigns was to unite the Great Silk Road into one country and ensure its security. Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi has repeatedly said that caravans and even ambassadors could not walk and it was dangerous to go on

pilgrimage due to violence by local rulers or an increase in spies in Mongolia, Iran and Iraq. In the battles with Tokhtamysh and Boyazid, however, the truth was entirely on Timur's side. For Amir Temur, issues related to the Middle East and Europe, which have geopolitical interests, were considered more important. Stop was a constant obstacle on Turan's way out to the western regions. In fact, at that time, Western countries could not be considered as more developed and rich regions. Therefore, the focus of Tokhtamysh was on the subjugation of the southern peoples, who were rich in all respects, with great culture and creative potential. In addition, for Sahibkiran, the inevitability of a confrontation with Boyazid in the geopolitical future was becoming increasingly clear.

Amir Temur was well aware of the complex and contradictory relations between Boyazid and European states in the Eurasian region and their conflicting goals. In this regard, he was in no hurry to march against Boyazid, even though he listened to the Western ambassadors. His sharp wit, logic, and experience indicated neither distrust of the Europeans nor of their diplomats. He was also well aware that the minds of Europeans who heard the name Boyazid would be in a hurry, in which case he pursued an extremely sensitive policy. Consequently, in the work of Nizamiddin Shami; "By nature, I don't want to go there and send troops to that country," he said. (Amir Boyazid) I do not want the Farangs to be supported and the people of Islam to be weakened because they are constantly raiding the Farangs. But Black Yusuf was a robber and a roadblock, and the damage he has done to Muslim cities from his conspiracy and corruption was greater than that of the outsiders around him. Amir Boyazid took him

under his protection and gave him a place. Now he has to do one of three things: first, use a sword to stop him, finish his work, or send it to us so that we can ask for his sin and punish him according to what he has done. If (Amir Boyazid) does not want either of these two things, let him be expelled from his country! Then there will be fatherhood, friendship and alliance between us, we will give and take daughters, we will help and assist in whatever we can in our campaigns with the disbelievers. "

The positive response of the letter would have highlighted the priority of the interests of the Turkish states in ensuring the balance of power in the region. However, the Turkish historian explains: "Even if the pillars of the state and the nobles encouraged Yildirim to reach an agreement with Timur's cavalry and elephants, his victories and successes in the world, it did not help." According to sources, the cause of the dispute turns out to be Boyazid. It follows that while there have been arguments about the power of Sahibkiran and the inadmissibility of the two Turkic states entering into conflict, can it be said that the Ottoman state disagreed with the reasons for not taking into account the balance of power in foreign policy? Is it enough to evaluate the experience of the experienced Boyazid, who managed to pull the reins of the Middle East, with these arguments? Or were there external forces that brought conflicts between the Turkic states that defined the pillars of the Eurasian region?

At the end of the fourteenth century, a historical situation arose that in Asia, partly in Africa and Europe, Ottoman Turkey, Amir Temur, the Egyptian Mamluk Empire, the Golden Horde and Ming China emerged as the most powerful states. Syria, part of the

Circassian state led by Sultan al-Zahir Barquq, who came to power in Egypt in 1382, became a powerful country along with Iraq and the holy shrines of the Hijaz, which served as a protection for neighboring countries in the East. As the power and prestige of Amir Temur's state grew, his anxious neighbors began to turn to the Mamluk kingdom of Egypt for help. For example, when the governors of Sinjar, Caesarea, and Takrit sent a letter to the sultan of Egypt in 1383 stating that they considered themselves his subjects and that they had read the sermon in his name, Sultan Barquq immediately complied with their request and appointed them his deputies.

The emergence of the Turanian state and the triumphant march of a skilled commander, especially its future prospects, were of concern not only to the Mongols but also to the states of the Middle East. To be honest, it was difficult for them to accept the fact that Movarounnahr was simply a child of a prince who was interfering with the territorial and regional order that has become a tradition of inheritance formed over the centuries. From this point of view, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Mongolia, the Ottoman Turks, China, and the rulers of the Caucasus, who were partners and allies in these intentions, became allies under the leadership of the Golden Mediterranean princes. They hoped to easily restore their broken political dominance in Movarounnahr soon. As we can see, the state of Turan went beyond the territorial framework and remains under the pressure of the Eurasian region.

It is reported that Tokhtamishkhan, who aspired to regional leadership, exchanged representatives with the Mamluks and Ottoman Turks several times in order to constantly coordinate their actions against

Amir Temur. In 1394, the ambassadors of the Egyptian sultan Tokhtamish and the Turkish sultan Boyazid met in Damascus and agreed to act together against Timur, and the heads of the Turkmen emirates bordering the Mamluk state also sent a message of obedience to Sultan Barquq. The 15th-century Egyptian historian Jamaluddin Abulmahasin Yusuf ibn Tangriberdi, in his 1963 book *Cairo's Bright Stars on Egypt and the Cairo Empire*, reported the formation of a secret alliance of conspirators to fight Amir Temur. Boyazid's ambassadors were also present.

The aim of the formed regional military bloc was to put in place the proud, barlas-derived "tirrancha" and to show who would be in power throughout Eurasia. It doesn't look like that. Amir Temur realizes this danger in time. He negotiates with all his enemies separately, presents them with gifts, threatens them when the time comes, and manages to destroy them. So use all the available tools wisely. But, for that, he is doomed to stay on the horse for the rest of his life. In these struggles he loses his sons and grandsons, his best and most loyal comrades. It could not have been otherwise, since there was a constant risk of constant military marches or death and Turan falling into the hands of the enemy. The reasons for his marches, therefore, were not only to occupy the trade routes, but also to eliminate the constant dangers on Turanzamin. The Union of States, which did not recognize the Sahibkiran government, united every second and increased the probability of attacking Turan.

However, we know the processes by which this "alliance" was crushed separately and individually by the geopolitical skills of Sahibkiran. The French historian M. Sharmua explains the reasons for the disintegration and

eventual destruction of the anti-Amir Temur forces in the Eurasian region: With his wise policy he manages to eliminate his enemies individually. He attacked Timur, the main initiator of the alliance agreements, and deprives the Tatars of their allies who have been excluded from the field of active international politics. The Antitemur alliance would not have time to take action." explains. At the same time, Amir Temur wisely took advantage of Barquq's reluctance, Tokhtamish's ignorance, and Boyazid's haste. He was able to read the consequences of the decisions made by the minds of the enemies. He multiplied it by territorial distance, mobilization, organization, material resources, and the military skill and devotion of his commanders. Amir Temur is the wisest and wisest in capturing the situation. For, a much more difficult situation would have arisen for him if the Allies had understood the course of events and united in their favor.

Now as for the desire of Amir Temur of 1404 to march on China, it must be revealed that there were certain political purposes there. The first reason was that Turan wanted to break the vassal ties that bound him to the Chinese emperor, which had diminished over the years, and the second was that he aimed to convert all Chinese to Islam by launching a campaign against the non-believers. The point is that from the Ming dynasty, in 1368-1398, the Chinese emperor, who replaced the Yuan emperor, a representative of the Zhu Yuan-Zhang Mongol dynasty, united Mongolia and China. Moreover, the Chinese ruler does not hide the fact that he demands tribute from the Turan state, and openly oppresses it. In diplomatic correspondence, the Chinese emperor called Amir Temur "my son" and insulted Sahibkiran. In diplomatic language,

this notion meant dependence, which in turn offended Jahangir severely. It is said that he sent ambassadors of four hundred cavalry to the great king of China, Amir Temur, the purpose of their arrival was to receive the tribute previously paid to his father and not paid in recent years. Sahibkiran returned home from Samarkand with enthusiasm and announced that he would soon go in person. He then orders his officials to prepare to go to China.

T. Schiltberger and G. Clavijo also expressed their views on this issue in their works. The ambassadors wrote that these lands were gifted to you for management, you know you have to pay tribute every year, you have not paid your taxes for seven years. Where did the issue of paying tribute come from, and what are the grounds for such a claim against a great ruler like Sahibkiran?

Tilman Nagel said that in about 1389, for the first time in Nanjing, the capital of the Ming, Amir Temur's envoys visited China and paid tribute to the Chinese for the terms of the peace treaty. Moreover, another reason for marching to China in 1405 was the death of the zealous founder of the Ming dynasty, Hong-wu, which created chaos for the kingdom and created a favorable environment for military march. According to Rakhmanaliev's analysis, after Genghis Khan's conquest of Asia, Movarounnahr came under the rule of one of his sons, Chagatai. Later, the empire was divided into separate kingdoms, and the great Qubulai, the grandson of Genghis Khan, ascended the Chinese throne, which was conquered by the Turkic-Mongols, and the Chaghatay Khanate was subordinated to him. Since then, the rulers of Samarkand have regularly honored the Mongol khan of China and his successors. In the 14th century, a

popular uprising led by Min-Hong-Wu drove the Genghis Khans out of China. When he ascended the throne, the ruler of Mavoraunnahr asserted that in this case he had asked Timur, who had authority over these territories, to pay tribute to Beijing by paying tribute. The Grand Emir agreed to the demand, binding on the obligations and avoiding the conflict between China and Mavoraunnahr. In 1385, after the emperor Ming's two ambassadors were arrested and released, in 1385 he was limited to sending him presents once every two or three years, which could be considered a tribute to him. But his successor, Yun Lo, reluctantly insists on paying tribute to the Turanian lands as land. Yung-Lo's reckless move accelerated the military march on China.

Can the reasons for Amir Temur's scenario of territorial domination in the Eurasian region from the West to China be related to these arguments? This issue also requires some consideration. Consequently, Western states that became semi-vassals after Boyazid can no longer influence regional stability. The forces left over from the Ottomans are relatively equal. It is now clear that they are incapable of serious confrontations other than petty disputes. However, China, unlike the West, was the last of the countries to jeopardize regional stability and balance of power. In recent times, under their reluctance, Kashgar had no intention of seizing the opportunity to invade the Turan state through Mongolia. On the other hand, in the context of the disintegration of the Genghis Khan dynasty, they also realized long ago that Amir Temur would inevitably invade China, the last stronghold of the Mongols. Striving to expand its independence, Sahibkiran was well aware that he could not secure a dominance of

forces in Eurasia without eliminating the Chinese threat. Therefore, he may have had the goal of throwing the main power at China at that time without paying serious attention to the weak but cunning West.

After the death of Amir Temur, internal conflicts weakened. On the other hand, the fragmented Turan and the weakened Turkish and Arab states are losing control of the Eurasian region one after another. Europe, on the other hand, is making the most of this situation. Previously, he did not dare to enter the trade routes, but now Sahibkiran is wandering in any area with his "fatwa". Moreover, the discovery of sea routes destroys the political, economic and cultural significance of this region. Thus, new opportunities for owning world resources emerge. However, Sahibkiran provides a great opportunity for Tokhtamish to maintain the unity and power of the Turkic states, shows kindness to Boyazid, cooperates with the Arabs, and sponsors the restoration of the Iranian state. However, this state is not able to understand the regional policy of Amir Temur in the pursuit of their narrow interests. Lack of ideology leads to the degradation of a region where cultural historical ties are one. No matter how hard Amir Temur tried to preserve the trans-regional land force (trade artery), the geopolitical landscape of the world took on a completely different look between 1350 and 1450. In this regard, we see that European countries, although they have waged genocidal wars with each other, have a culture of united struggle against external threats, unlike Muslim countries.

The double gifts given to Amir Temur in his time were a kind of struggle to preserve the existence of humble words, to leave their state as a whole and powerful heritage for

future generations. Of course, this does not end the ideological struggle, and the ensuing innumerable and ongoing conflicts have weakened the Turkic states. In a sense, this was a sign of the decline of the culture of nomadic peoples and the rise of Western culture. If Boyazid could reasonably reflect the current geopolitical situation and the balance of international forces without arrogance, perhaps Amir Temur would have focused on the West, not the Mediterranean. Imagine how much the regional landscape of the world would have changed if we had walked west and Boyazid had entered from its southwest side ?! In fact, the issue should have been so, given the need for a natural and logical direction of geopolitical efforts. However, we know that the historical situation is completely different.

It is also interesting to note that the historical interpretation of "Boyazid's defeat - the triumph of Europe" is one-sided. Amir Temur's services as a "European savior" will rise to the skies. In the details of the letter to Boyazid, Sahibkiran did not set such a goal. Consequently, it should be noted that Boyazid's state power, military discipline and high skill were considered to be one of the most mature examples of his time. He was, in a sense, the gatekeeper of the West and the East. After the fall of this gate, the modern stages of the "crusade" that is still going on are not over. However, in the struggle for geopolitical interests, Boyazid manages to defend the integrity of Eurasia by joining forces with the united forces of the whole of Europe. He crushed the Crusaders, founded by Europe in 1396.

According to historical records, Manuel II, a small Trapezund king who broke away from Byzantium, planned to establish diplomatic

relations with Amir Temur to fight the rulers of all European countries against Boyazid. According to the plan, various recommendations will be made to destroy Boyazid, and one of them will undertake to allocate 20 ships in the event of a water attack (this promise will not be fulfilled). Hayrulla Ismatilla from Indiana University draws some conclusions in his article based on many relevant sources on the subject. Including; "Manuel II's great contribution to the European cause was that he and his associates, together with the Catholic clergy, in various ways quarreled and fought between the two great Turkish generals, Amir Temur and Boyazid, and were, first of all, invincible for Europe managed to break the strength of the Turkish army.

Second, by trying to form an alliance with Amir Temur himself, he persuaded other European kings to form an alliance and managed to dissuade the Shah of the Amir's troops from marching on the European side. Third, Manuel II took the final destiny of Boyazid's sons into his own hands and slowed the collapse of Byzantium. He argues that it has laid the groundwork for Europe to balance itself. In conclusion, first of all, it becomes clear that the alternative to the truce initiative of Timur's enemies was the formation of an "alliance" against him and the disputes over some territories that led to the Ankara war. Second, if we logically follow the situation in Europe and Byzantium at that time, it is clear that the kings and emperors of these regions were more likely to encourage Timur to fight against the Ottomans.

Of course, objectivity is achieved through the comparative study of historical methodological approaches and the recommendation of consumption without

concealing or distorting existing ones. Even then, we leave the judgment to the Creator. Undoubtedly, regional relations have always been one of the practical ways of foreign and domestic policy. There is no denying that this has been the case since the time of our ancestors. However, is it correct to conclude that the struggle between Amir Temur and Sultan Boyazid was carried out as a result of someone's conspiracy, even though such an attempt was made? An observation of Sahibkiran's geopolitical thinking, he did not arouse suspicion in anyone in his time. His political and military experience and military achievements have repeatedly demonstrated his supernatural ability to erroneously assess the demands of the situation. He has always been able to measure the benefits and harms of his own interests and opportunities to achieve them. Of course, a series of historical processes can also cause large, sometimes extremely small factors to change their major streams and divert from the main mission. For example, Black Yusuf himself was a small bandit in the regional context, but his "Games" were needed by the big powers. At points of interest, of course, the destructive function of such "nails" is natural. In fact, Boyazid does not realize that the content of Sahibkiran's letter contains the interests of the above-mentioned geopolitical cultures. This short-sightedness is costly for all Turkish peoples. Sadly, civil wars and conflicts undermine the long-standing trade, economic, and cultural ties of the Eurasian states with the countries of the Far East, Central and Central Asia, and the Mediterranean and Europe. After the death of Sahibkiran, although there were some individual settlements, the regional cultural infrastructure did not re-emerge. The

geography of gravity as Central Asia's "Earth's axis" is changing.

In general, you will encounter an interesting paradox in the history of the Turkic states. Byzantium and China have always had a great influence on the disintegration of any khanate that emerged between Eurasia. Whether they are Qarakhanids, Seljuks or Ghaznavids, this historical geostrategic situation will be repeated in the time of Amir Temur. The Byzantine conspiracy, the Chinese intrigue, had a serious impact on the fragmentation of the cultural strata of the brave, courageous, lazy, but, at times, top-down Turkic peoples. For example, during the reign of the Seljuk Sultan Malikshah, Byzantium was known to use diplomatic means to provoke China against the Seljuks and to wage a war between them. China, in turn, surpasses their courage with elements of "popular culture." Unlike the Turkic peoples, Genghis Khan began his victorious march by putting China in a "cage." However, the bitter truth of life is that for the sins committed, no party is deprived of the inevitable punishment of the Creator. L. Keren regrets the consequences of these political tricks. His views on the tragic fate of the immoral relations planted in his time are among the important and objective conclusions. The Genoese, Venetians, and Byzantines, who had undertaken to pursue the Ottomans who had fled to the sea from the persecution of Sahibkiran, helped a large part of the Turkish army and most of the Boyazid nobles to cross the European shores in exchange for large sums of money. Among them was Boyazid's eldest son, Suleiman, who achieved this by signing an alliance with Byzantium. By doing so, they are digging a well for themselves, he says, revealing the cause of the blame stones falling on Europe.

Amir Temur loses the unprecedented opportunity given to them by fate and saves his fierce enemies who will destroy them half a century later.

As a result of the political short-sightedness and selfishness of the Europeans, the Ottoman Turks soon regained their power after Amir Temur. The losers of the Battle of Ankara would soon capture Constantinople and take revenge on the Grand Amir's vicious "allies." Surprisingly, however, Amir Temur, who was naturally aware of the intrigues of European and Byzantine sailors in the Bosphorus, never opposed them. He took this betrayal for granted.

These sources confirm that Amir Temur's policy of military campaigns in Eurasia was not aimed at aggression or domination. It has also been acknowledged in many sources that he did not seek to establish his authority in the occupied territories. While the wars fought during these years were mainly aimed at ensuring the security of the territories of Movarounnahr, some were directed against the non-Muslims who were persecuting the Muslims. It is interesting to note that the war will not be without casualties, of course, the war will require large sums of money. War is a phenomenon of great loss, of devastating bloodshed. All this represents the nature of war. However, when asked what Jahangir's goal was from regional military campaigns, Russian and Soviet authors usually put the issue extremely acutely, saying that wars of aggression were waged only to gain wealth. When it comes to ideological interests, it is. This is due to the fact that Amir Temur influenced the development of Russian statehood. In Russian sources (mid-15th century), the story of Timur the Lame, the author of which is unknown, appears. In this

story, his origin is described as a lowly, robber, invader, atheist, and evil king. He concludes that his battle with the Stop had a purposeful march aimed at invading Russian lands. This folklore story defines the image of Russian source studies and for many years has become a settled view of Russian historians. At the same time, Russian historians N.M. Karamzin, S.M. Solovev, V.O.Klyuchevsky of the late XIX and early XX centuries did not pay attention to the services of Amir Temur in the formation of Russian statehood. There was a deep meaning in looking at the calendar, of course. It is difficult to admit that any "military leader" from an Asian nomadic tribe would have contributed to the emergence of Russian statehood.

However, A. Yakubovsky, who is more aware of the historical evidence, admits that Amir Temur's victory over Tokhtamysh saved Russia from 150 years of Mongol oppression. Amir Temur succeeded in crushing these united armies at a time when Kiev was working with the Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish principalities to completely subjugate the Russian principalities. On the contrary, the Russian people were in danger of becoming slaves and disintegrating. He says the battle has historical significance in this regard. However, it is surprising that the scholar expresses the services of Sahibkiran with great arrogance. He continued: "Temur is distinguished by his huge military organizational skills, state thinking, strong will and special potential.

At the same time, he is the son of his time and no higher than that." How to understand this ironic comment? If he had immense ability, high thinking, strong will and special potential, and with these qualities he established new political regimes in Eurasia, would it not mean

that he had gone beyond his time? Let's pay attention to another opinion of the scientist: - "Temur fights with the Golden Horde from the point of view of Central Asian interests without establishing contacts with the princes of Moscow. However, he has, objectively speaking, done a useful job not only for Central Asia, but also for Russia. Timur did not know what significance he had for Russian history with his blow to the Golden Horde. At the time, the Russians didn't have the right understanding. " he says. They also hold the view that on September 8, 1380, in the Kulikova Square at the confluence of the Npnyadva River with the Don River, a radical turn was made in Russian life after the battle between Dmitry Donskoy and Mamay, one of the influential deputies of the Golden Horde. However, after the Battle of Kulikovo in 1382, Moscow was recaptured by the Stop, and they still paid tribute to the Golden Horde, which means that they were mute.

According to their claim, "Pamyatnikax literatury Drevney Rusi: XIV - seredina XV vv." The fact that Amir Temur saved Moscow from the attack is explained by the fact that the Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich brought the icon of the Holy Ruler from Vladimir to Moscow and the people of the city worshiped him, so the lame Timur returned to his homeland. Surprise! What is the basis and logic in these views? The unscientific statements made by scientists calmly are astonishing. Is it possible to draw such bold and narrow conclusions about a ruler who has taken the world into account? Is it known who controlled the principalities of Moscow? What did he have to agree with? Was there a negotiating state itself? Amir Temur at that time, in our opinion, had not yet thought of cooperating with the scattered and scattered

Russian princes. After all, they had no political influence in the region. In their conclusions, they emphasize Amir Temur's belief that he would attack countries where oppression and corruption were rampant and lawlessness was on the rise, and that he was committed to his ideas on the Russian issue as well. Therefore, although Vasily Donskoy had long been in agreement with the Horde, he did not help him with his troops in the battle with Amir Temur and Tokhtamysh (Kunduzcha in 1391), the Russians showed examples of solidarity, high courage and discipline in his victory over Mamay. According to Russian scholars, Amir Temur won over the Russian troops in Elets, but lost his strategic military initiative. He feels that this situation will not bring him success. He goes out to Kulikov Square and sees fighting in rivers, forests, swamps and groves as a sign of defeat. Once upon a time, Botukhon defeated the scattered, unformed Russians here. Amir Temur, on the other hand, cites the formation of a coalition as the main reason. "Interestingly, Yezdi and Shami talked about Temur's march against Moscow, that is, non-existent Moscow," Rakhmanaliev said. However, in his work he does not deny the tribute received from the Russians. So where did these tributes come from and from which prince? There is no answer to that. Of course, like Amir Temur, we are not as interested in the question of whether he entered Moscow, which is not of strategic importance in the interests of Eurasia. The issue goes beyond the analysis of historical sources.

According to Professor Uljaeva's analysis, Russian scholars have denied that Timur did not take Moscow and did not cross north of Elets, arguing that both Nizamiddin Shami and Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi were mistaken and misled that Moscow actually meant Ryazan.

Yakubovsky even claimed that Timur had come to the Oka near Kolomna and had not crossed to the other side, that is, to Moscow, because he was afraid to clash with Russian troops led by the "great prince" Vasily Dmitrievich (son of Dmitry Donskoy) standing on the other side of the river. He also said that the news of Mamayn's defeat in Kulikovo Square in 1380 had frightened Amir Temur. Grekov and Yakubovsky acknowledge that Nizamiddin Shami and Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi's reports on a number of events are true. But when it comes to Moscow, it seems that their geographical location is not clear. In our opinion, this statement is a manifestation of the great Russian chauvinism, which has always been aimed at making Moscow invincible. According to sources, the historians of that time in the "Zafarnoma" have pages that show that they had a clear idea of the lands not only in Moscow, but also far north, even beyond the Arctic Circle.

The first source: "Sahibkiran came to Moscow, he was from the city of Rusnung, he was interested. At that moment, the Nusratshi'ar cherik conquered the province (city and its environs) and subjugated the governors. And innumerable cattle fell on the cherik's deer: gold, silver, and silver kabsh, and hatanu qoqam, and kattonu, black sable and swords, and good horses. The second source: "Amir Sahibkiran decided to march towards the Russian city of Mushku (Moscow), he raided and plundered all the lands of the region, and the army took immeasurable booty." is called. As we can see, the failure of Russian scholars to consider sources without relevant evidence has also confused many historians.

We have already mentioned the reasons why Sahibkiran did not stay in Moscow, among other occupied territories. When the stop is

lifted, the capital Palace loses its status as a shopping center at the crossroads of the Silk Road. Amir Temur moved him to Samarkand via Tabriz. Second, after the defeat of Tokhtamysh, the Golden Horde was divided into western and northern regions and handed over to the rule of the former beys of Urushan, Toghluk Temur and Ediku. Ediku was one of the beys of Tokhtamish. After the defeat of Tokhtamishkhan Amir Temur in 1395, until 1419, various khans were alternating on the khanate throne, but in fact power remained in the hands of Ediku. He entered the Russian chronicles under the name of Edigey. Ediku was from the Mangit tribe and was an Uzbek from the Golden Horde.

The success of Amir Temur's geopolitics did not consist only of geographical factors or the dominance of military means. In geopolitics, the primary and fundamental factor is to subjugate the situation to one's own destiny, to turn one's destiny into an opportunity for success. In this regard, luck has always flowed to Sahibkiran. He was able to see the political turmoil and chaos in the region extremely clearly. Therefore, each military march was organized not on the basis of a specific situation, but on the basis of consistent and step-by-step plans set by him. However, his military campaigns are built on specific goals and are aimed at strengthening their military power, experience and resources. In this regard, Amir Temur, taking into account the balance of power with restraint and composure, carried out military attacks while expanding his capabilities. Understanding the flow of the geopolitical situation, being able to use its natural processes in its own interests, never allowing passions, the measure of common sense served as the basis of his victorious marches. In this regard, he

will first unite Central Asia and East Turkestan, and then march to the Golden Horde, Iran, Iraq, India, Turkey. It will take almost 10 years for the struggle to break the stalemate. He is in no hurry to go to China, but he has been preparing for it for almost 10 years.

CONCLUSION

What is the basis of Amir Temur's geopolitical goals? First of all, it should be noted that although he was a master of horrific military demonstrations, his actions were not based on force. However, victory is not a physical concept, on the contrary, it means spiritual, taking the initiative, breaking and subduing the will of the enemy. Sahibkiran first of all sought to turn these regions into stable regions not by force, but by intellect and skill, while eliminating the weak, fragmented rulers of the Eurasian region, and he achieved this. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Amir Temur entered the international political arena. He became the savior of humanity, which was plunged into world wars. According to O. Zotov, Sahibkiran was a ruler who was able to turn the Eurasian continent from war and plunder into a peaceful and stable region. He turned the center of Eurasia - the "black space" (instead of the territories where the empire of Genghis Khan's successors were divided) from a zone of chaos and "war against all" into a zone of peace, stability and development. He did this in a historically very short period of time. Although Timur's entire life (1336-1405) coincided with half of the hundred-year Anglo-French war, it took 20 years of his life to unite all the opposing forces in his empire to build and consolidate a great empire. It stopped the crusade in North, South and West Asia, and

the expansion of Western Europe into Asia in general. ” Indeed, Sahibkiran's geopolitical activity is distinguished by its relevance to the goals. He succeeded in establishing a stable and powerful state in Turan without striving for world domination. This state did not have as clearly defined and protected borders as the Chinese and Roman empires. In occupied territories like Genghis Khan, he does not seek to establish his authority, to subdue the nation completely, and to maintain his dominance. As a result, Central Asia will become the core of the multi-layered cultural poles of Eurasia, the axis of regional gravity. In the Eurasian region, trade, peace and prosperity was established, genocidal wars and piracy was stopped, and cooperation between states was established.

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