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Ibn Sina On The Role Of Reasoning Forms In Achieving The Truth

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ABSTRACT

In this article, Ibn Sina's logical views, in particular his ideas on forms of thinking, are discussed in the context of the process of achieving truth. At the same time, it is revealed on the basis of Ibn Sina's logical views that such forms of thinking as perception, judgment, and inference are important elements in the process of achieving truth. That is, while the definition of a concept is a necessary element in the process of achieving truth, considerations are revealed, in particular, complex considerations and conclusions based on an analysis of Ibn Sina's works on logic. Importantly, it is logical that Ibn Sina's conception of truth as a final stage in the conclusion that reasoning is a form of thinking is logical.

KEYWORDS

Reasoning, truth, definition, description, concept, gender, subject.

INTRODUCTION

Ibn Sina developed and interpreted Aristotle's logical teachings with his logical views in the works Salvation, Encyclopedia, and Signs and Criticism. Any science or knowledge is based on imagination or belief. Imagination comes first and is captured by definition, but as long as a person imagines an object or event, he gives it

a positive or negative description. If imagination is possessed by definition, persuasion is achieved by conclusion - he argues. According to Ibn Sina, definition and inference are two means of reasoning, by

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means of which one differs from the known unknown. Ibn Sina believes that the choice of one of these two means depends on the possibilities of thinking. "Therefore, if a person acquires the science of logic, he will avoid (or avoid) various mistakes in drawing conclusions" (Ибн-Сино, 1992).

Hence, the correctness of the ideas should be checked with logical considerations. "Logic teaches people to move from what is in the mind to what does not come from the mind.

METHODS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Ibn Sina highly values the knowledge of the truth, rather than the perception in distinguishing the right judgment from the wrong judgment. "Perception is the way to go to the unknown through the known. Logic is the science that teaches what is not learned through knowledge, what is true, what is close to the truth, what is false, and how different each of them is" (Ибн-Сина, 1957).

The issues of Ibn Sina's logical views were influenced by Porphyry's ideas in Eysogoge. According to A. Sagadeev's research, the idea of concept and judgment is "given as imagination and affirmation on the one hand, and meaning and judgment on the other (Сагадиев, 2009). Depending on the context in which these concepts are used, the first case is about a concept and judgment developed through reflection, and the second is about a concept and judgment that arises spontaneously in the lower cognitive powers of the soul.

According to this view, the concept as a form of rational cognition is a generalized mental image of the most important signs and properties of the object, a generalized image of the essence of its existence. These considerations of Ibn Sina lead to a general conclusion about the theory of abstraction, concepts, the relation of categories to an objective being. He believed that common reality existed in existence as the basis of general understanding, that commonality was objective and not dependent on reason, and that common sense was the mental expression of objective commonality existing in reality itself, things, objects and events. This view of his cannot be absent from the mind either because the General Concept is general in the Encyclopaedia. But its essence (i.e., the object and the phenomenon, the general signs and properties of the object that constitute the content of the concept) exists both in the mind and outside it, because the essence of humanity and darkness exists both in the mind and beyond (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 2016). In particular, he writes in Ash-Shifa: "Commonality exists in things because of its generality. As for the general concept, it cannot exist outside the imagination because it is a general concept. Commonality is regarded as one of its parts as a reality, and each part constitutes its existence. The general concept is not calculated by its parts, and the parts are not related to its existence. The following quote from Ash-Shifa confirms the above statement: "An animal is a natural being with all its accidents. There is an image of a single animal in the mind. It is therefore an image that is a product of the mind. The image of the animal present in the mind corresponds to many realities that exist outside the mind. This means that the only image created by the mind applies to many individuals. In this sense, the image of the "animal" is the only, general mental concept

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that applies equally to any animal that is formed in the imagination. Therefore, the mind separated the image of the animal from the accident and reflected it in itself, so that a clear image appeared in it. So, this image consists of "something" (information) that abstracts the "animal" from an external objective reality or a similar reality, as if it had formed an individual imagination (А. А. Ибн-Сина, 2016). In his analysis of the problem of categories, Ibn Sina consistently adheres to epistemological principles: categories as the most general gender of concepts are essentially a reflection of the most general and universal genderes of being. In doing so, it divides the categories into primary and secondary. He believes that the primary categories are derived from emotional objects. They are essentially a mental image formed on the basis of the generalization of images of emotional information (information). In this way, concepts such as "man", "living being", "plant", and "metal" were formed.

Secondary categories are essentially general concepts formed on the basis of generalization of primary categories. They represent the gender and kinship relationships of the primary categories. In this sense, secondary categories are also essentially objective things, mental images of objects and events.

It should be noted that Ibn Sina did not deny that there could also be empty volume concepts. Such concepts as "tree man" and "flying man", which are the product of fantasy and have a false meaning, are among them. These ideas in Ibn Sina's concept of understanding are ideas that are reflected in modern logic. From the point of view of the theologian, concepts with empty dimensions and fantastic meanings are formed in the imagination by the misrepresentation and separation of certain connections and relationships related to reality.

Ibn Sina's views on the essence of concepts, the ratio of generality and specificity also differ from Aristotle's views. It is well known that Aristotle, on the one hand, rejected Plato's teaching that concepts are separate reality, and on the other hand, he considered them to be the essence of all existence, the supreme, perfect being. Ibn Sina, on the other hand, asserted that the general concept exists only in the mind. But the essence, as the basis of the general concept, exists both in the mind and beyond, in the objects. According to Ibn Sina, universals exist in three different forms: before objects (in the unseen world), in objects, and after objects (in the human mind). “Know that an idea formed by the mind is derived from real things. For example, it happens that through observation and perception we obtain an image of the sky created by the mind, but it also happens that the image obtained by the mind is not derived from real things, but vice versa, the real thing comes from the image obtained by the mind. It happens that first a mental image of a particular building is formed in our mind, and then that image moves our members to build that building. So the building existed, and we didn't know it, we knew the building, and then we created it. That is the true meaning of burning up of bad psychic imprints" (Диноршоев). This idea of Ibn Sina was continued in the views of medieval Western European philosophers.

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So, according to Ibn Sina, there is no concept in things, there is information in things that is the basis for understanding, that is, real properties that serve to form the concept.

Concepts exist either in the human mind or in the unseen world. The concepts that exist in the human mind are mainly a reflection of the common features in related things. But there are also empty-volume concepts in his mind that are the product of imagination and do not represent any reality, nor do they represent concepts before real things, such as the notion of a building that has not yet been seen but we have imagined. But the next meaning is to misinterpret the notion that the concept existed even before the object, because it shows that the concept before the object was actually formed is based on previous experiences of man and mankind. According to Ibn Sina, the concept of "God" is the result of a religious worldview to the notion that it precedes real objects.

Ibn Sina was well aware of the place and importance of general concepts in science, without which the content of science could not be expressed. "Scientists," he writes, "do not use specific words and concepts, although each type of concept has many features, and their activities are linked to general concepts" (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980b). Ibn Sina regarded concepts as "cells" of judgment (thought) and mental inference, as a means of expressing the content of science, and substantiated the ontological and epistemological nature of the concept.

Ibn Sina's Theory of Concepts The relation of idea and name, predicate and subject in Aristotle's Categories; ten categories, about the concepts of "previous", "next" and "together"; potentiality (possibility) and actuality (reality) correspond to the ideas of the four causes. Among these, it is important to describe the relationship between names and the ideas they express. Eastern peripatetics, in particular Ibn Sina and his disciples, have identified 6 types of such relationships:

Homonymous objects - even if they have a name, what is understood under this name has no resemblance, just as the word "ayn" means both spring and eye.

Objects with the same name - their names are the same, and what is understood under the same name will have similarities, even if they are different from each other. Just as he says that both the animal itself and its image are animals.

Objects whose names are pronounced "with suspicion" (that is, by analogy) have the same name as the objects under which they are understood, but in one case they are primary and in another they are secondary to the objects they represent. For example, while the name “existence” is applied to a primary substance, it is applied to different levels of secondary events.

Objects with the same name - both their name and what is understood under the same name - are almost the same, just as we call a person and a horse "animal". All common names are equally strong and equally meaningful to the properties combined under that name. This applies not only to predicables, but also to general accidents.

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Synonymous objects - even though their names have the same meaning, the phrases that express the same idea are not the same, just like people and people.

Objects with different names - both their names and those understood under the same name - are different from each other.

Defining the concepts of gender, species, and their characteristics described above is important in defining concepts.

According to Ibn Sina, "The purpose of description is to determine the true nature of an object. The purpose of depiction is to imagine an object, even if one does not know its essence. So to describe is to understand the essence of the subject" (Ибн-Сино, 1992). Ibn Sina's methods of description are also studied in modern formal logic. Although the thinker could not fully explain the logical nature of such methods aimed at revealing the content of the concept, he tried to correctly explain the essence and function of these methods. He correctly understood the essence of the definition of concepts and justified their role in knowing reality by developing methods and rules for defining concepts, defining scientific terms.

Ibn Sina said, "a concept is like a wrapped, enchanted knowledge, you have to spread it, unravel the enchantment, read what is inside. The most important way to achieve this is by definition, statement, and so on (Ибн-Сино, 1992). The knowledge reflected in the concept of an object is read out of the talisman by finding signs of its gender and type. For example, to know "what a person is," it is necessary to know the characteristics of his type. One of them is "animal", the other is "mind". Anyone who knows what an animal is and what the mind is will come to the inevitable knowledge that "man is an intelligent animal." However, it is necessary to know the rules of description in order to correctly determine the content of the concept. Ibn Sina bases his position on the ideas of Aristotle: a) the concept should not be self-defining, that is, the definition should not be self-linked like a chain (for example, "Time - the duration of action"); b) should not be defined by another concept equal to itself (such as "Black is the opposite of white" ...); c) the concept should not be defined by another concept that is abstract in itself (such as "Fire is a body like a soul"); g) the concept should not be defined by another concept that comes from itself ("Sun - the star that rises during the day"); d) Metaphors and allegories that impede clarity, clarity and uniformity of meaning should not be used in concepts (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980a). Hence, these rules show the following types of defining the content of Ibn Sina's concepts, which have both ontological and epistemological meanings (Ибн-Сино, 1992). They are as follows:

- Full description - a description consisting of the combination of the concept of close gender with the sign of a close species;
- Incomplete description - a description given by indicating a distant gender and a close distinguishing mark;
- Full description - description by indicating the gender of the close and the insignificant special sign;

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- Incomplete description - a description of the subject by showing a long gender and an important sign;
- Description of complexity by individuality - description by quoting several general features that have a special relation to the described object;
- Nominal definition - a description that shows the meaning of one concept using another familiar concept.

According to Ibn Sina, a complete description is the basis of apodic judgments, an incomplete description is the basis of dialectical judgments. The other four views of the description are used in rhetorical, sophistic, and poetic discussions.

The thinker defined philosophical-scientific terms at the same time as developing the theoretical foundations of definition as a logical action. Ibn Sina's Treatise on Definition describes 72 philosophical categories, such as mind, soul, matter, element, substance, accident, and also discusses in detail the origin and function of concepts and terms (Ибн-Сино, 1992). In doing so, he argues that erroneous definitions cannot be the basis of evidentiary knowledge, that is, the basis of syllogism. He answers the question of whether an unknown concept will be proven when it is defined. In his view, the description represents the basis of the proof, not the proof. This knowledge of his fits in perfectly with the views of Aristotle and complements it.

According to Ibn Sina, narration is different from definition, it reveals the content of the knowledge related to the concept through narration, it covers important and random features of the concept. The thinker 1) describes the gender on the basis of understanding (such as "Man is a two-legged animal with flat claws, laughing at its nature"); 2) distinguishing between descriptive and accidental descriptions (such as “A triangle is a shape with three angles equal to two straight lines”).

In the teachings of Ibn Sina, the second type of rational cognition is judgment (thought), and the scientist analyzed its logical structure, volume and content (quantity and quality), types, their contrasts (contradictions) and counterdirectives (contradictions). According to Ibn Sina, "Judgment (thought) as a type of knowledge represents the legal connection of objects and events in reality, their mutual conditioning." Thought (judgment) is the knowledge of the legal connections of things, which means that "in apophantic discourse there is either an affirmative or a negative opinion about the relation of one concept to another." (Ибн-Сино, 1992)

For Ibn Sina, like Aristotle, calls a judgment a statement made by affirming or denying something. Judgments can be true or false. Indeed, in Aristotle's Topic, if our knowledge is true, it is true, and if it is not, it is wrong (Аристотель). Ibn Sina also believes that the truth or falsity of rulings is determined by comparison with reality. “It is possible to determine whether the judgments are true or false. Some thoughts represent a question, please, hope, suggestion, surprise, and so on. It is impossible to determine whether they are true or false. This can only be determined when something is reported in the mind.

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Indeed, in a grammatical analysis, only the verb represents the sentence.

Ibn Sina argued that the components of a sentence, like Aristotle, consist of a logical possessor (subject), a logical cut (R-predicate), and a logical connector.

He analyzed the sentence both logically and grammatically, the logical possessor is represented mainly by the noun (noun - grammar), and the logical participle is represented by the noun, the verb (- gram). The logical conjunction states that affirmation (is) or denial (is not) is not expressed by a set of words (Аристотель).

Judgments are made with or without the negative part, and when the negative part is added to a word, the word added by that word is denied. The negation suffix is part of the predicate. For example, Zayd does not read. In every strict sentence there is something (logical connection) that unites the subject and the predicate.

At the same time, Ibn Sina analyzes the expression of the logical connection in Arabic and Persian (А. А. Ибн-Сина, 1980а). For example, "Zayd kotib" is in Arabic, "Zayd dabir ast" is in Persian, and ast is a conjunction. The negation suffix is added to the logical link. Denial sometimes comes in double, where the denial is written before the additional conjunction, and in some cases after the conjunction.

Ibn Sina and Aristotle's views on judgment and its structure have a common ground, and they are distinguished by the breadth of their analysis of the views on the types of judgment.

The apophantic speech is not as simple and firm as our judgment: "If the sun has risen, then the day has begun." Here we are judged by the affirmation of the relationship between our thoughts: “The sun has risen” and “The day has begun” - the second comes from the first. Our judgment, "Either the sun rises, or it is night," requires that there be an alternative relationship between the two judgments. In each of these two examples, there is a unit (combination) in the sentence, in which the judgment is made about that relation, that is, the apophantic relation. Therefore, our judgment that the Sun has risen confirms the relationship between the Sun and the Sun. All such judgments are said to be conditional. The ones that look like the first example are called unifying sentences, and the ones that look like the second are called separating sentences.

Not only conditional sentences, but also fixed ones represent certain legal connections of subject and predicate that reflect the presence or absence of relations in reality itself. Ibn Sina wrote that the relation of a predicate to a subject exists in affirmative and negative sentences, as well as in the same way, or in itself necessary (our "Man is a living being" and "Man is not a living being"). (like the concept of "living being" in our judgments), or will be necessary (like the concept of "stone" in our judgment "Man is a stone" or "Man is not a stone"). Therefore, the content of the sentence is the necessary content, the possible content, the impossible content (А. А. Ибн-Сина, 1980а). Hence, the most basic feature of judgment (thought) as a form of rational cognition is that, according to it, judgment represents the necessary, constant connection and relationship, not the essence and properties of individual objects.

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They are studied, as Ibn Sina said, both by direct observation and by reflection (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980a). Judgment differs from understanding in that it is inevitably either true, or false (false), or clear, or close to the truth. The reason for this is that judgment (thought) is an apophantic, decision-making speech. Therefore, if it accurately reflects the laws and interdependence of things, it will certainly be real, clear, otherwise - close to the truth, false. If there is a concept, it just says the name of the thing, it neither confirms nor denies! Therefore, it can be called neither true nor false (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980a).

Thinking through thinking is different from knowing a concept in its way of occurrence and formation.

That is, the means of forming an opinion is proof. “For everything that is not yet known,” he writes, “there are ways to know. There are ways to describe and narrate for understanding. There is a way to prove a sentence, it comes in three forms: syllogism, induction, and analogy. Proof of a hidden "thing" (information) through an open "thing" (information) is also included in the analogy. Of these three types of proof, the most reliable is the syllogism, and the best of all syllogisms is the proof syllogism (Диноршоев). A syllogism is a consideration consisting of several sentences. For example, “Every body has a shape. When it is said, "Everything in shape is created," meditation becomes a syllogism, because it necessarily leads to the conclusion that "any body is created." Indeed, any understanding of something is the result of meditating and knowing it. At the same time, understanding becomes the basis for judgment.

Regardless of the type of syllogism, Ibn Sina's explanation of the essence in this way indicates that the syllogism is a method of acquiring acquired knowledge, that is, knowledge based on and derived from some previous knowledge. Without this knowledge, that is, without these judgments which constitute the syllogism, no syllogism can be considered. At the level of knowledge acquired, some new scientific ideas can indeed be derived from the inner logic of knowledge. Knowledge at this level can really predict, or even theoretically substantiate, the nature of some phenomena that have not yet been the subject of experimental research.

In the absence of advanced methods of scientific thinking in medieval conditions, the absoluteness of the cognitive power of the syllogistic method also determined the speculative and abstract nature of the scientific and philosophical observation of that period. But, on the other hand, it should be noted that scientific reasoning, especially in theoretical observation, is unlikely to be abstract, no matter what the period. Although Ibn Sina thought of syllogism and considered it the main method of cognition, he did not deny other methods of cognition, on the contrary, he believed that induction and deduction also had a certain importance in cognition.

CONCLUSIONS

For Ibn Sina, on the one hand, believes that induction is a form of mental inference, so that it can be used to draw apodetic and probabilistic conclusions, and on the other hand, it is possible to obtain real or probable general knowledge about objects, events and

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processes by testing and observing absolutely all or some calculated. "Induction is a judgment for Ibn Sina that he finds in common, with all its features" (Диноршоев). He distinguished between two complete and incomplete types of induction. Complete induction is the formation of knowledge and general apodictic conclusions based on the identification of all individuals from a particular set of objects and events, class, gender. Ibn Sina's definition of complete induction was revealed by MN Boltaev using the following formula: (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980a)

A means - r

V means - r

S means - r (A, B, S form the plural S)

Hence, all of S is essentially - r.

At the same time, incomplete induction is such a mental conclusion that it is used to draw a general, close to reality, probabilistic conclusion. To do this, first an individual belonging to a particular class of objects and events is observed, and studied.

However, Ibn Sina believed that induction, and especially incomplete induction, could not be a reliable method of knowing because it was close to the truth, so "it does not always mean true knowledge," because it is possible that they (people) contradicted what they did not see. The event is the same, and one of them is the opposite (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 2003). It should be noted that Ibn Sina founded induction 500 years before the English scientist F. Bacon as an independent form of mental cognition and a method of theoretical cognition, which proved that this method helps to obtain knowledge close to reality (complete induction) and probabilistic (incomplete induction).

Ibn Sina also added an analogy to the means and methods of thinking: "Analogy is the inference of a thing as a result of observing something similar to it" (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980b). Therefore, while the conclusion on the analogy may be clear or correct on the one hand, it may be clear or incorrect on the other hand. But it should not be inferred from this that Ibn Sina denied the importance of analogy in cognition. For example, the analogy in this case, as in the sentence "Some A's are essentially B's," would be a correct proof of the third figure. For example, if you say, "It is like A, that is like B" it means, "Some A's are the essence of B" (A. A. Ибн-Сина, 1980b). The assertion of the above opinion of the thinker means that he revealed in his logical conclusions that the method of analogy is capable of imparting the necessary knowledge close to reality.

Ibn Sina argues that the basis of achieving truth is to draw logical conclusions. Accordingly, forms of thinking are manifested as a means of achieving reality together. Ibn Sina's idea that understanding is the basis for reasoning about the external structure of an object, and that reasoning is the basis for drawing the right conclusions, shows the need to use the possibilities of thinking to achieve positive results. At the same time, in order to draw the right conclusion, there must be an unbiased consideration of the nature of things.

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